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Abstract
This paper argues that international migration of high-skilled workers triggers
productivity e¤ects at the macro level such that the wage rate of skilled workers
may well rise in host countries and decline in source countries. We exploit a
recent data set on international bilateral migration ows and provide evidence
which is consistent with this hypothesis. In order to identify the causal e¤ect of
migration on wages, we propose di¤erent instrumentation strategies which address
the endogeneity problem arising from the fact that international wage di¤erences
a¤ect migration decisions.
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1 Introduction
The recent surge in international migration of high-skilled workers not only raised the
standard concern about adverse brain drain e¤ects for developing countries but also led
to worries of native high-skilled workers in advanced destination countries.1 Domestic
workers with higher education levels are afraid to see their wages decline in response to
increased competition from similarly qualied migrants. Whereas debates on migration
have centered around asylum rights and low-skilled migrants in the past, over the years
politicians and mass media discovered the issue of high-skilled immigration. For instance,
In Switzerland and Austria, the discussion recently has become emotionally charged
due to signicant inows of tertiary educated workers particularly from Germany.2 For
the US, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2009) nd that skilled natives tend to oppose
immigration more in states with a relatively skilled mix of immigrants than in states
in which the skill composition of immigrants features a high proportion of low-skilled
immigrants. Similarly, a recent panel study by Müller and Tai (2010) for Europe suggests
that higher-skilled workers have less favorable attitudes towards immigration, the more
skilled the immigrants are relative to average skill level in the destination country.
This paper examines the question whether domestic skilled workers have reason to op-
pose high-skilled immigration and, vice versa, whether non-migrating high-skilled work-
ers win or lose from brain drain in source countries. We argue that international mi-
gration of high-skilled workers triggers productivity e¤ects at the macro level such that
the wage rate of skilled workers may well rise in host countries and decline in source
countries. By exploiting a recent data set on international bilateral migration ows
(Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell, 2007), we empirically examine the impact of an increase
in high-skilled emigration rates on di¤erences in both (log) wage income of skilled work-
ers and per capita income between pairs of source and destination countries. We propose
a wide range of instrumental variables to address the potential reverse causality problem
1The number of tertiary educated immigrants living in OECD countries has increased from 12.5
million in the year 1990 to 20.4 million in 2000 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Half of the skilled
migrants resided in the US and about a quarter in other Anglo-Saxon countries.
2High-skilled immigration surged in Switzerland after Switzerland entered in 2005 a bilateral agree-
ment with the EU on the free movement of labor.
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which arises from the fact that international wage di¤erences a¤ect individual migration
decisions (e.g., Lucas, 2005; Grogger and Hanson, 2008; Egger and Radulescu, 2009).
We derive a structural empirical model from a theoretical framework which suggests
that, even when taking adjustments in educational decisions into account, an increase in
high-skilled emigration (immigration) lowers (raises) the domestic skill-intensity in pro-
duction.3 This has two e¤ects on relative wages of the high-skilled between destination
and source economy. First, for a given total factor productivity (TFP) and as a conse-
quence of declining marginal productivity of a certain type of labor, high-skilled workers
lose in the destination and win in the source economy. Second, however, external e¤ects
of migration on TFP (positive in destination, adverse in source) may reverse this result.
The net e¤ect of high-skilled migration on international wage di¤erences is thus theoret-
ically ambiguous. This makes the relationship between high-skilled migration and wages
an empirical question. Our empirical analysis suggests that, if anything, the external
productivity e¤ect dominates.
Our ndings are consistent with recent literature on wage e¤ects of high-skilled im-
migration in single countries. Borjas (2003) and Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005)
provide evidence for a small but positive impact of an inow of immigrants with a college
degree on wages for college-educated natives in the US and UK, respectively. In a similar
vein, Friedberg (2001) shows that native wages rise when immigrants enter high-skilled
occupations in the Israeli labor market. Our contribution shows the theoretical possi-
bility of positive wage e¤ects and provides international evidence by exploiting data on
bilateral migration between country pairs, thereby complementing single-country studies
on labor market e¤ects of immigration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
theoretical model. The model provides the basis for the structural estimation in section
3 of the e¤ects of higher emigration on relative wage income as well as relative GDP per
capita between source and destination. The last section provides concluding remarks.
3Grossmann and Stadelmann (2010) develop an overlapping-generations model with endogenous
education choice which shows how migration is triggered by a decrease in mobility costs of high-skilled
workers and how it may evolve over time. In the present paper we focus empirically on the e¤ect of
higher international migration on wages for skilled labor.
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2 Theoretical Considerations
Our theroretical analysis shows that the presence of external productivity e¤ects through
education implies that the wage level of educated workers may rise in the host country
in response to an increase in high-skilled migration and may fall in the source country.
2.1 Set Up
Consider an economy with a unit mass of individuals, indexed by i. Each individual
decides whether to become high-skilled, which may require both pecuniary costs e  0
(equal for all individuals) in terms of a homogenous consumption good and non-pecuniary
(e¤ort) costs which may di¤er across individuals. High-skilled individuals may emigrate,
but derive lower utility for a given income earned abroad than when staying at home
(representing mobility costs).4 Individuals take the migration opportunity into account
when deciding on education.
Formally, for a given income level yi, indirect utility of individual i is given by
Vi =
8>>><>>>:
~vi(yi) if i migrates,
viH(yi) if i does not migrate and is skilled,
viL(yi) if i remains unskilled,
(1)
where we assume ~vi(y) < viH(y) < viL(y) for all y and i. Functions ~vi, viH and viL are
increasing in income.
The consumption good is chosen as numeraire. Output Y is produced under perfect
competition according to the technology
Y = AF (H;L)  ALf(k); (2)
where H and L denote high-skilled and low-skilled labor input, respectively, A is total
factor productivity taken as given by the representative rm, function F is linearly
homogenous, k  H=L denotes the skill-intensity of production, and f(k)  F (k; 1). f
4In order to focus on e¤ects of migration of high-skilled workers, we make the standard assumption
in the brain drain literature that low-skilled labor is immobile.
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is increasing and concave, and fullls the standard boundary conditions.
There is a positive external e¤ect of a higher skill-intensity in production, k, on total
factor productivity:
A = a(k); (3)
where a is an increasing function.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Let wH and wL denote the wage rate for high-skilled and low-skilled labor at home,
respectively, whereas wH denotes the wage rate for skilled workers abroad. The marginal
non-migrating entrant into education, {, derives the same utility from becoming a skilled
worker at home and remaining unskilled, i.e., v{H(wH   e) = v{L(wL). It follows that the
fraction/number of individuals choosing education can be represented by s = S(wH ; wL),
where function S is increasing in wH and decreasing in wL. Similarly, utility function
(1) implies that the number of emigrants (who are all skilled by assumption), m, can
be represented by m =M(wH ; wH), where M is increasing in foreign wage rate w

H and
decreasing in domestic wage rate wH for the skilled.
According to (2), competitive factor prices read
wH = Af
0(k); (4)
wL = A [f(k)  kf 0(k)] : (5)
In labor market equilibrium, the number of domestically born high-skilled individuals is
the sum of those working at home and those migrating: s = H + m. The number of
low-skilled workers is L = 1   s. Thus, the domestic skill-intensity, k = H=L, can be
written as k = s m
1 s ; equivalently, we can write
s =
k +m
1 + k
 ~s(k;m): (6)
We nd partial derivatives ~sm > 0, and using m < 1, ~sk > 0.
Using s = S(wH ; wL) together with the expressions (4) and (5) for factor prices as
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well as relationship (6) and assumption A = a(k) in (3), we nd that the equilibrium
skill-intensity is implicitly given as a function of the number of migrants, m, by
~s(k;m) B(k) = 0; (7)
where
B(k)  S(a(k)f 0(k); a(k) [f(k)  kf 0(k)]): (8)
We write k  K(m) for the solution of (7).
Suppose that function B is decreasing in skill-intensity k. For instance, this would be
the case if the fraction of skilled individuals s = S(wH ; wL) were dependent on the relative
wage rate of non-migrating skilled workers, wH=wL,5 i.e., if function S were homogenous
of degree zero.6 It follows that the equilibrium skill-intensity K(m) is decreasing in the
number of (skilled) emigrants, m, i.e., K 0(m) < 0.
According to (3) and (4), the equilibrium wage rate for non-migrating skilled labor
is given by
wH = a(K(m))f
0(K(m))  W (m). (9)
It follows for the e¤ect of higher emigration, m, on the domestic equilibrium wage rate,
W , that
W 0(m) =

a(k)f 0(k)
k
["(k)  (k)]

k=K(m)
K 0(m),
where "(k)  ka0(k)=a(k) and (k)   kf 00(k)=f 0(k). Thus, the sign of W 0(m) is
theoretically ambiguous due to two opposing e¤ects. First, for a given total factor
productivity (TFP) A, high-skilled workers win in response to higher emigration in the
source economy due to a decreasing marginal productivity of skilled labor ( > 0).
Second, however, adverse external productivity e¤ects of migration (" > 0) in the source
5To see this, note from (4) and (5) that
wH
wL
=
f 0(k)
f(k)  kf 0(k)
is decreasing in skill-intensity k and function S is increasing in its rst argument.
6The properties of function S depend on the distribution of non-pecuniary education costs as captured
by utilities viH() in (1). We do not specify utility further. Property B0(k) < 0 indeed holds under a
large set of weak conditions, due to declining marginal productivity of labor.
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economy may reverse this result. If " > , i.e., if the elasticity of productivity A with
respect to skill-intensity k exceeds the elasticity of the marginal productivity of skilled
labor for a given TFP with respect to k, then high-skilled workers see their wages decline
with higher emigration. (Recall that the equilibrium skill-intensity, K(m), declines with
m.) If " < , the opposite holds.
Consider now a two-country world and denote foreign destination country functions
and variables with superscript (*). That is, let k = K( m) be given by ~s(k; m)  
B(k) = 0 under (net) emigration of m workers to abroad, where function B is dened
analogously to B in (8). The foreign wage rate is
wH = a
(K( m))(f )0(K( m))  W ( m): (10)
Then the relative wage rate for skilled workers in the foreign destination relative to the
home source country can be written as
wH
wH
=
W ( m)
W (m)
 !(m): (11)
For instance, if technologies are identical internationally, we nd that !(m) is increasing
in m if and only if " > , whereas !0(m) < 0 if and only if " < .
The individual migration decision depends on wage di¤erences between countries and
the number of migrants is given by m = M(wH ; wH). At the macro level, however, the
e¤ect of high-skilled migration on international (log) wage di¤erences is theoretically
ambiguous. The direction of the e¤ect thus is an empirical question addressed in the
next section, where we estimate the sign of !0(m) by employing data on bilateral migra-
tion. The potential reverse causality problem which comes from the individual migration
decision is addressed by using various instrumentation strategies.
Further remarks are in order. We have not specied the time structure in the theo-
retical considerations so far. If the model were fully static, equilibrium migration would
be the solution to m = M(W ( m);W (m)).7 A shift in migration costs as captured
by ~vi() in utility function (1) would shift function M and may trigger an increase in
7Multiple equilibria and stability issues may arise; see Grossmann and Stadelmann (2008).
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the number of emigrants m. Being interested in wage e¤ects, this would suggest to
estimate a contemporaneous relationsship wH;t=wH;t = !(mt), where t is the time in-
dex. Grossmann and Stadelmann (2010) develop an overlapping-generations framework
to theoretically consider the dynamic interaction between international migration and
international wage di¤erences for the skilled. In their model, a higher number of in-
termediate good rms induces specialization gains which raise TFP after some lag and
high-skilled emigration has adverse e¤ects on the foundation of rms. Assuming that the
lag is one period, thus, relative wages of the skilled abroad positively depend on lagged
emigration: wH;t=wH;t = !(mt 1).
8 Employing the notion that economies are still in
transition phases (out-of-steady state) suggests to estimate this relationship rather than
the contemporaneous one. In the empirical analysis which now follows, we do both.
3 Empirical Analysis
Our theoretical analysis has highlighted the interaction between emigration of high-
skilled labor and the wage income gap to potential host economies of expatriates. To
recall, on the one hand, the individual emigration decision depends on di¤erences of
wage income to potential destination economies; formally, the number of migrants is
m = M(wH ; wH). On the other hand, at the macro level, higher emigration of skilled
labor may a¤ect international wage di¤erences; formally, we have wH=wH = !(m), where
m a¤ects ! through counteracting channels: external TFP e¤ects and the e¤ect on the
marginal productivity of skilled labor.
The direction from wage income di¤erences to migration ows has been examined
empirically elsewhere. Two recent papers are notable. First, Grogger and Hanson (2008)
provide convincing evidence for the critical role of wage di¤erences between country
pairs on emigration patterns of tertiary educated workers.9 Second, Beine, Docquier and
Ozden (2010) show that, in addition to wage di¤erences, network e¤ects are important for
8By contrast, relationship mt =M(wH;t; wH;t) would remain contemporaneous.
9In the working paper version of this article (Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2008), we presented
evidence for the interaction between emigration ows and income changes using a structural equation
model. However, we looked at the impact of a higher aggregate emigration stock of a country on its per
capita income. That is, we did not consider bilateral relationships.
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the migration decision for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. That is, emigrants
already living in the destination country positively a¤ect migration ows in a causal
way.10
Our empirical analysis complements their research by focussing on the opposite di-
rection, i.e., from emigration to international wage di¤erences for skilled workers. The
tested hypothesis is that, due to productivity e¤ects, increased migration of high-skilled
workers may raise (log) income di¤erences between country pairs even for skilled workers.
3.1 Data and Estimation Strategy
The emigration rate of high-skilled individuals is our main explanatory variable. Doc-
quier and Marfouk (2006) have established a dataset of emigration stocks and rates by
educational attainment for the years 1990 and 2000. The authors count as emigrants all
foreign-born individuals aged at least 25 who live in an OECD country and class them
by educational attainment and country of origin. Thus, only emigration into OECD
countries is captured, approximately 90 percent of educated migrants in the world.11
As we are interested in the bilateral migration pattern of high-skilled individuals, we
focus on emigration of the high educational category provided in an extended dataset
by Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007). We construct the high-skilled emigration rate
from country i to j in year t, denoted by Migij;t, as the stock of skilled emigrants from
country i living in (OECD) country j divided by the stock of skilled residents in (source)
country i in year t.
Denote by yi;t the income measure in country i in year t, which is further specied
below. We estimate, for a country pair (i; j):
log

yj;t
yi;t

= 0 + 1Migij;t + x
0
ij;t 1x + uij;t: (12)
Equation (12) is theoretically motivated by relationship wH=wH = !(m) in (11).
10This suggests that there exist mobility-cost reducing network e¤ects from communities of people
from the same nation and from friends and relatives already living abroad (see also Massey et al., 1993).
11See Docquier and Marfouk (2006) for a detailed discussion concerning data collection and construc-
tion issues.
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The theoretical model suggests that 1 > 0 if and only if TFP e¤ects of migration
are su¢ ciently high. xij is a vector of other controls potentially a¤ecting log income
di¤erences between i and j like relative school enrolment rates, relative investment rates,
relative urban population shares, and xed e¤ects for the source country to capture
institutional di¤erences to OECD destination countries. These controls are lagged in the
estimation to reduce endogeneity bias. We focus on (the log of) relative wage income in
the year 2000 as dependent variable and take the lag to be 10 years. uij is an error term.
As an empirical measure of (log) relative wage income, log

yj;t
yi;t

, we would ideally use
(log) di¤erences in wages by the education category dened for our main explanatory vari-
able Migij;t, i.e. we would like to use (log) wages di¤erences for high-skilled individuals.
Since incomes by education category are not available to us, we use three di¤erent empir-
ical measures. Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) have collected information on earnings
by occupation and industry from the International Labor Organizations (ILO) October
Inquiry Survey from 1983-1998. In order to correct for di¤erences in how countries re-
port earnings, Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) use a standardization procedure to make
the data comparable across countries and time. In 2005 they provided an update for
their earnings measures for the 1983-2003 ILO October Inquiry data using an improved
version of the standardization procedure and the application of country-specic data
type correction factors.12 For each country, we take Freeman and Oostendorps earnings
measures corresponding to the 80th and the 90th percentile as two measures for wages
of high-skilled workers.13 For most countries, data are available for a just a few years.
Thus, for each country we take the mean across the period between the years 1995 to
2003 and create a dataset of 89 destination and 23 source countries for the year 2000.14
The two constructed (log) relative wage variables for the 80th and the 90th percentile
are denoted by RelWage80ij;t and RelWage90ij;t.15 Productivity e¤ects of brain drain
12A detailed technical documentation of the standardization procedure for the 1983-2003 ILO October
Inquiry data is available online on http://www.nber.org/oww/.
13Freeman and Oostendorp report di¤erent series of their earnings. We use the series country-specic
calibrations with imputation in US$.
14We also included Turkey where data for the year 1994 was used.
15One may argue that migrating skilled workers do not receive wage income in the same percentile
than at home, i.e., someone working in the 80th percentile at home earns wage income in, say, the 60th
percentile abroad. Using corresponding alternative relative wage measures leads to very similar results
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as captured in our theoretical model may also be reected when looking at di¤erences
in (log) relative GDP per capita. We estimate the e¤ects of bilateral migration on this
additional dependent variable, denoted by RelGDPij;t.16
Variable denitions, data sources and summary statistics of the employed variables
are presented in Tab. 1.
< Table 1 >
As indicated, while recent empirical literature has focussed on the impact of income
di¤erences on migration patterns, we aim to examine the opposite channel. Thus, the
empirical analysis needs to address potential endogeneity bias. In a rst attempt to deal
with endogeneity, we replace the high-skilled emigration rate in 2000 by the lagged one in
1990 in OLS regressions. Moreover, as discussed at the end of section 2, thereby we also
account for transitional dynamics (towards the steady state) in a dynamic framework
where wHt=wHt = !(mt 1). Also this requires to replace Migij;t in (12) by the lagged
emigration rate Migij;t 1.
Second, and more importantly, we instrument the high-skilled emigration rate for the
year 2000. We use the lagged rate of total expatriates who emigrated from country i to
j, TotalMigij;t 1, as an instrument forMigij;t thereby predicting the rate of high-skilled
emigrants by the lagged rate of all emigrants. This can be motivated by the notion that a
larger percentage of emigrants from a certain source country already living abroad act as
a signal to potential high-skilled migrants concerning openness, treatment of foreigners
by administrative bodies, and perceived social links in the destination. Moreover, a
higher rate of emigrants to a certain destination creates mobility-cost reducing network
e¤ects for emigrants of small source countries.17 TotalMigij;t 1 also measures other
intangible factors unrelated to income such as reputation, cultural proximity, and social
openness to migrants of the destination as perceived by emigrants of the source country.
than the one reported.
16Using GDP data rather than wage data also has the advantage that the number of observations
increases due to better data availablity.
17Another way to capture the e¤ect of mobility-cost reducing network e¤ects is to use stocks instead of
rates (e.g. Massey et al., 1993; Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2010). In supplementary material (available
upon request), we also provide estimates with the (log) stock of total emigrants. Results are basically
unchanged.
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The past total emigration rate should not inuence contemporaneous income di¤er-
ences beyond the impact exerted by high-skilled emigration itself. The simultaneous use
of two or more instruments allows us to check the empirical validity of this condition
through J-tests. We employ indicators for geographical factors (Distij, Contigij) and
linguistic proximity (ComLangij) which are typically used in the literature on migration
as additional instruments. These instruments are supposed to capture migration costs
(which in the theoretical model were captured by assumption ~vi() < viH() for utility
levels in (1)).
In a third attempt to address potential endogeneity bias, we use the total emigration
rate in 1960 as instrument, which, however, cannot be readily observed. We construct
two proxies for the total emigration rate. Denote byNetMigi;1960 the total net emigration
rate (number of emigrants minus number of immigrants divided by population size) in
country i in the year 1960, provided by the United Nations Population Division.18 The
rst proxy of bilateral total emigration rates in 1960 is dened by
TotalMigP1ij;1960 :=
NetMigi;1960  Popj;1960
Popi;1960
; (13)
where Popi;1960 is population size in the source i and Popj;1960 is the population size in
the destination j in the year 1960.19 As argued by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001),
one may use countriespopulation sizes to reect immigration quotas. NetMigi;1960 
Popj;1960 thus is a proxy for the net stock of emigrants from country i received in country
j in 1960. As our empirical strategy focuses on emigration rates rather than stocks, we
divide this measure by population size of source country i to obtain an estimate for
the past bilateral emigration rate. As a good instrument, the past total emigration
rate should be correlated with the high-skilled emigration rate in 2000, Migij;t. This
is supported by calculating partial correlations. The fraction of high-skilled migrants
before 1960 was comparatively low and thus potential e¤ects of past migration should
only work through induced high-skilled emigration. In other words, the instrument
18Countries with negative net emigration are coded to have an emigration rate equal to zero.
19The construction of the rst proxy is inspired by Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2010). They use a
similarly constructed proxy as an instrument for the total diaspora of migrants in 1990 (rather than the
high-skilled emigration rate).
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should be uncorrelated with the dependent variable which is supported by J-tests.
We also construct a second proxy of bilateral emigration rates. We explain the
observed the bilateral (log) total emigration stock in 199020 in a linear regression model
with the following variables: distance between two countries (Distij), common language
(ComLangij), diplomatic representations between 1946 and 1960 as well as the total
number of militarized interstate dispute between the same period from the Correlates of
War Project (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004). Using the resulting coe¢ cient values
without a constant, we predict total bilateral emigration from i to j from the estimated
model and add the value of the product NetMigi;1960Popj;1960. The sum is divided by
the population of the source country i in 1960 (Popi;1960) to obtain a second proxy for
the bilateral emigration rate in the year 1960. This proxy thus accounts for geographical
factors and historical factors. It is denoted by TotalMigP2ij;1960.
3.2 Results
Reported standard errors from all estimates account for destination clusters, following
Grogger and Hanson (2008), among others.21
< Table 2>
Tab. 2 presents OLS estimates of equation (12). Columns (1), (4), and (7) estimate
the e¤ect of the high-skilled emigration rate in the year 2000 (Mig2000ij) for the depen-
dent variables (log of) relative wages in the 80th percentile, relative wages in the 90th
percentile, and relative GDP per capita (RelWage80ij;t, RelWage90ij;t and RelGDPij;t,
respectively). The coe¢ cient of interest, 1, is always positive and signicantly di¤erent
from zero at the one percent level. The other columns in Tab. 2 report results when
using the lagged high-skilled emigration rate, for 1990 (Mig1990ij). This accounts for
transitional dynamics and also serves as a rst step to account for potential endogeneity.
The sizes of coe¢ cient 1 in these estimations are similar. Thus, an increase in the
20Like the corresponding emigration rate, TotalMigij;t 1, the variable is provided in Docquier, Mar-
fouk and Lowell (2007).
21We use the Huber-White method to adjust the variance-covariance matrix from our least squares
results, to correct for heteroscedasticity and for correlated observations from cluster samples.
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high-skilled emigration rate raises (log) income di¤erences between countries. According
to our theoretical model, this points to non-negligible TFP e¤ects of high-skilled migra-
tion. The control variables of all estimates include the lagged relative school enrolment
(primary and tertiary), the relative capital investment and the relative urban population
share as well as source xed e¤ects. The controls have the expected signs apart from
primary schooling which is not signicant. The relative investment rate and the relative
urban population share are typically signicantly di¤erent from zero. In columns (3), (6)
and (9) we exclude the insignicant school enrolment variables and only include signi-
cant controls. This increases the number of available country pairs. The coe¢ cients of
the high-skilled emigration rate remain signicant and increases slightly for all estimates
compared to the other results.
The results in Tab. 2 also show that the size of 1 is similar across specications
for wages in the 80th and 90th percentile. To get a feeling for quantitative e¤ects, with
a coe¢ cient 1 around 0:2, as suggested by our estimates, doubling the high-skilled
emigration rate (Migij;t) from its mean level of 0:025 (see Tab. 1) implies that relative
wages rises by approximately 0.5 percent (= 0:2  0:025).22 This e¤ect is rather small,
thereby being consistent with the microeconomic estimates of the e¤ect of high-skilled
immigration on wages for the high-skilled inside the US by Borjas (2003) and for the
UK by Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005). Contrary to the concerns of high-skilled
natives in destination countries, the e¤ect is positive rather than negative.
< Table 3>
Tab. 3 deals with the potential reverse causality problem by providing IV-estimations
of (12). In columns (1), (3) and (5) we use the total emigration rate from country i
to j in 1990 (TotalMigij;t 1) as single instrument. In the other regressions, measures
of geographical factors and linguistic proximity are used as instrument in addion to
TotalMigij;t 1. As in Tab. 2 and the following tables, we still control for lagged rela-
tive values of school enrolment, private investment and urbanization and include source
country xed e¤ects (results not shown).
22In fact, between 1990 and 2000 the number of tertiary educated immigrants living in OECD countries
almost doubled (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).
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The upper panel of Tab. 3 reports second stage results while the lower panel reports
the partial correlations of the additional instruments in the rst stage. Columns (1) and
(2) present results for relative wages in the 80th percentile. The rst column uses the
total emigration rate in 1990, TotalMigij;t 1, as a single instrument for the high-skilled
emigration rate,Migij;t, in 2000. The rst stage results indicate that the total emigration
rate in 1990 is well correlated with Mig2000ij. According to second stage results in
column (1), 1 is again positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero at the one percent
level. In columns (2), (4) and (6) we use the bilateral geographical distance between i
and j (Distij), an indicator for a common border (Contigij) and an indicator for common
language of source and destination country (ComLangij) as additional instruments for
Migij. The coe¢ cient estimate of 1 in column (2) is again signicant, positive and
of similar size as in column (1). A F-test for the rst stage results shows that the
instruments are signicantly related to the emigration rate.23 Columns (3) and (4)
conrm the results for the dependent variable (log) relative wage in the 90th percentile.
The e¤ect of the instrumented high-skilled emigration rate on wage di¤erences is positive
and signicant in all estimates. Columns (5) and (6) show results with (log) relative GDP
di¤erences as a dependent variable. The instrumented variable Migij;t again turns out
to have a positive and signicant e¤ect. None of the J-statistics in Tab. 3, which deal
with the overidentifying restrictions, point to problems with the instruments.
Overall, the rst stage results suggest that factors potentially unrelated to income
such as a destinations reputation, network e¤ects, language and geography drive the
high-skilled emigration rate. More importantly, the results of the IV-regressions support
our main hypothesis of a causal e¤ect of higher emigration on log wage di¤erences to
host economies. Interestingly, the coe¢ cients on the instrumented variable Migij;t in
Tab. 3 are more than twice as high than in OLS regressions (Tab. 2). This suggests
that migrants who arrive through social networks have a particularly high impact on
TFP. According to columns (1)-(4) in Tab. 3, doubling the high-skilled emigration rate
(Migij;t) from its mean level implies that the relative wage of high-skilled workers abroad
23That contiguity (variable Contigij) has a negative e¤ect on high-skilled emigration in our rst-
stage estimate parallels a similar nding as in Grogger and Hanson (2008). They explain the result by
selection and sorting e¤ects.
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rises by 1.5 percent (= 0:6 0:025).
< Table 4>
Lagging the total emigration rate as an instrument by more than ten years is sup-
posed to strengthen the argument of the exogeneity of high-skilled emigration rates for
between-country income di¤erences. Thus, we examine whether the positive impact of
an increase in high-skilled emigration on our relative income measures still holds when
the total emigration rate in 1960 is used as instrument. As described above, we use two
proxies of the bilateral emigration rate in 1960 for data availability reasons. The results
are reported in Tab. 4. The upper panel shows second stage results while the lower
panel presents partial correlations of the instruments in the rst stage. Columns (1)-(3)
focus on (log) relative wage di¤erences in the 80th percentile. As shown in the lower
panel, the constructed proxies TotalMigP1ij;1960 and TotalMigP2ij;1960 for the bilateral
total emigration rate in 1960 are well correlated with Migij;t and seem to serve as good
instruments (see F-tests for columns (1)-(3) and J-test for column (2)). Column (1)
again indicates that the relative wage e¤ect of increasing the instrumented high-skilled
emigration rate is positive and signicant at the one percent level. The same holds when
geographical instruments are used together with the proxy variable TotalMigP1ij;1960, as
reported in column (2). Column (3) shows that the size of the coe¢ cient 1 drops by one
half when the second proxy variable TotalMigP2ij;1960 is used as instrument. However,
the e¤ect remains positive and signicant at the 5 percent level. According the columns
(4)-(6), the impact of Migij;t on wage di¤erences in the 90th percentile is qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to the results for the 80th percentile. The signicance level
is even always at one percent. Finally, columns (7)-(9) report results for (log) relative
GDP per capita di¤erences as a dependent variable. According to the estimates, 1 is
again positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero in all specications using di¤erent in-
struments (once at the 10 percent level, if many instruments are included, and otherwise
at the one percent level).
We conducted further sensitivity analysis which is available on request. First, instead
of using source xed e¤ects we include regional dummies and a dummy variable which
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indicates whether also the source country belongs to the OECD. Second, we take past
migration stocks rather than rates as instruments for the contemporaneous high-skilled
emigration rate. Third, we employ an alternative emigration data set by Defoort (2006)
while constructing the migration proxies in a similar way as in Tab. 4. Signicance and
size of the coe¢ cients of interest remain similar in all of these alternative estimations.
< Table 5>
Finally, we instrument the high-skilled emigration rate in 1990 (Mig1990ij) rather
than the one in 2000 (Mig2000ij), again employing the proxies for total emigration in
1960. By doing so, we address potential endogeneity problems in the estimates in Tab. 2
using Mig1990ij, which may arise despite the lag of 10 years to the dependent variable.
The results are presented in Tab. 5. They show similar results to Tab. 4. Again, the
size of the coe¢ cient of interest, 1, in the IV-estimates are higher than those in the
OLS-estimates of Tab. 2.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed the impact of an increase in international bilateral migration
of high-skilled workers on relative wage income between pairs of source and destination
countries of expatriates. Our theoretical considerations suggested that an increase in the
number of migrants may increase international wage inequality by adversely a¤ecting
total factor productivity in the source economy and raising it in the host economy. Our
empirical analysis provided evidence which is consistent with this hypothesis. Using a
data set on bilateral emigration of skilled workers, our results suggest that an increase in
high-skilled emigration rates slightly raises wage income for skilled workers in destination
relative to source countries in a causal way.
Our paper thereby complements ndings from single-country studies by providing
international evidence on moderately positive wage e¤ects of high-skilled immigration.
At the same time, the evidence points to adverse rst-order e¤ects of brain drain for
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non-migrants in source countries.24 Regarding source country e¤ects, our analysis re-
emphasizes the traditional view on brain drain (e.g., Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974).25
Regarding destination countries, we do not nd empirical support for economic concerns
of skilled natives who oppose high-skilled immigration.
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Table 1 
Data description and sources 
Variable Description and source N Mean S.D. 
Mig2000ij 
[Mig1990ij]  
 
Stock of emigrants of educational category “high” aged 
25+ born in country i and living in OECD country j in 
year 2000 [1990] divided by stock of residents of 
educational category “high” in country i in year 2000 
[1990]. Stock of emigration and stock of residents of 
educational category “high” from Docquier, Marfouk 
and Lowell (2007).  
3052 0.0246 0.1909 
RelWage80ij Log of wage in 80th percentile of country j minus log 
of wage in 80th percentile of country i in year 2000. 
Wage data from Occupational Wages around the 
World (OWW) Database. 
1247 1.2650 1.4945 
RelWage90ij Log of wage in 90th percentile of country j minus log 
of wage in 90th percentile of country i in year 2000. 
Wage data from Occupational Wages around the 
World (OWW) Database. 
1247 1.1810 1.3953 
RelGDPij Log of GDP per capita of country j minus log of GDP 
per capita of country i in year 2000. GDP data from 
Penn World Table Version 6.2. 
3052 1.4360 1.2890 
RelPrimSchool1990ij Primary school enrolment in country j divided by 
primary school enrolment in country i in year 1990. 
Primary school enrolment rate from Global 
Development Finance & World Development 
Indicators. 
2403 1.2040 0.5211 
RelTertSchool1990ij Tertiary school enrolment in country j divided by 
tertiary school enrolment in country i in year 1990. 
Tertiary school enrolment rate from Global 
Development Finance & World Development 
Indicators. 
2477 10.2700 22.2216 
RelInvest1990ij Investment share in country j divided by investment 
share in country i in year 1990. Investment share from 
Penn World Table Version 6.2. 
3052 2.3350 1.9566 
RelUrban1990ij Urban population share in country j divided by urban 
population share in country i in year 1990. Urban 
population share from Global Development Finance & 
World Development Indicators. 
3013 2.0500 1.8872 
TotalMigij Emigrant population from country i living in country j 
divided by population in 1000 of country i in year 
1990. Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007). 
3052 1.6870 11.1509 
Distij Log geodesic distance in kms between country i and j. 
Mayer and Soledad (2006). 
3042 8.5170 0.9313 
ComLangij Dummy variable capturing if same language is spoken 
by at least 9 % of the population in country i and j. 
Mayer and Soledad (2006). 
3052 0.1311 0.3375 
Contigij Dummy variable capturing if country i and j are 
contiguous. Mayer and Soledad (2006). 
3052 0.0269 0.1617 
Notes: The range, mean and standard deviations are not weighted and based on the respective number of observations. Destination countries are the 30 
OECD members. Total number of observations depends on data availability for destination and source countries. An observation is excluded if bilateral 
data is not available or source country does not have any emigrant in destination country.  
 
a 
b 
Table 2 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates on income differences between countries 
Variable 
OLS  
(1) 
OLS  
(2) 
OLS  
(3) 
OLS  
(4) 
OLS  
(5) 
OLS  
(6) 
OLS  
(7) 
OLS  
(8) 
OLS  
(9) 
 Dependent variable: RelWage80ij Dependent variable: RelWage90ij Dependent variable: RelGDPij 
Mig2000ij 
 
0.2169a 
(0.0490)    
0.2290a 
(0.0483)    
0.1630a 
(0.0276)    
Mig1990ij  0.1645b 
(0.0678) 
0.2452b 
(0.1231) 
 0.1738b 
(0.0699) 
0.2534b 
(0.1231) 
 0.1386a 
(0.0418) 
0.1672a 
(0.0624) 
RelPrimSchool1990ij -1.0022 
(2.2117) 
-1.0057 
(2.2127) 
 -0.5458 
(2.0325) 
-0.5495 
(2.0336) 
 -0.3658 
(0.7655) 
-0.3683 
(0.7668) 
 
RelTertSchool1990ij 0.0105 
(0.0102) 
0.0106 
(0.0101) 
 0.0104 
(0.0099) 
0.0105 
(0.0099) 
 0.0046 
(0.0028) 
0.0047c 
(0.0028) 
 
RelInvest1990ij 0.4990b 
(0.2533) 
0.4975b 
(0.2533) 
0.5617a 
(0.2038) 
0.4356c 
(0.2430) 
0.4341c 
(0.2430) 
0.4953b 
(0.1944) 
0.2331c 
(0.1216) 
0.2317c 
(0.1215) 
0.2995a 
(0.0948) 
RelUrban1990ij 0.6594b 
(0.3052) 
0.6587b 
(0.3054) 
0.9347a 
(0.2484) 
0.5761c 
(0.3015) 
0.5754c 
(0.3017) 
0.8278a 
(0.2619) 
0.2113a 
(0.0805) 
0.2109a 
(0.0806) 
0.2875a 
(0.0741) 
(incercept) 0.6731 
(2.7047) 
0.6802 
(2.7058) 
-0.7328 
(0.6717) 
0.3170 
(2.5903) 
0.3245 
(2.5916) 
-0.6226 
(0.6595) 
3.6064 
(3.0786) 
3.6211 
(3.0845) 
1.8097a 
(0.5320) 
Origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1010 1010 1247 1010 1010 1247 2275 2275 3013 
Adj. R2 0.8476 0.8474 0.8290 0.8446 0.8443 0.8200 0.9395 0.9393 0.9320 
Destination clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %.  
 
Table 3 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates on income differences between countries (instrumental variable estimations) 
Variable 
IV  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
 
Dependent variable: 
RelWage80ij 
Dependent variable: 
RelWage90ij 
Dependent variable: 
RelGDPij 
Mig2000ij 
 
0.6026a 
(0.1457) 
0.5948a 
(0.1406) 
0.5888a 
(0.1443) 
0.5788a 
(0.1374) 
0.3036c 
(0.1601) 
0.3017b 
(0.1532) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1010 1010 1010 1010 2275 2266 
Adj. R2 0.8504 0.8507 0.8475 0.8479 0.9396 0.9394 
Destination clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-Test (first stage) 25.09 24.7 25.09 24.7 12.57 12.67 
J-Test  - 0.806 - 0.673 - 0.4611 
Instruments used TotalMigij TotalMigij + Disti 
+ ComLangij + 
Contigij 
TotalMigij TotalMigij + Disti 
+ ComLangij + 
Contigij 
TotalMigij TotalMigij + Disti 
+ ComLangij + 
Contigij 
First stage results (partial correlations) 
TotalMigij 0.0198a 
(0.0006) 
0.0196a 
(0.0006) 
0.0198a 
(0.0006) 
0.0196a 
(0.0006) 
0.0124a 
(0.0004) 
0.0123 
(0.0004) 
Distij 
  
-0.0099d 
(0.0057)   
-0.0099d 
(0.0057)   
-0.0166a 
(0.0053) 
ComLangij 
  
0.0277c 
(0.0151)   
0.0277c 
(0.0151)   
0.0227b 
(0.0108) 
Contigij 
  
-0.0772a 
(0.0236)   
-0.0772a 
(0.0236)   
-0.1009a 
(0.0219) 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c 
indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %. All estimations include RelPrimSchool1990ij , RelTertSchool1990ij, and RelUrban1990ij  as additional control 
variables.  
c 
Table 4 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates on income differences between countries (use of proxies) 
Variable 
IV  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
IV 
(9) 
 Dependent variable: RelWage80ij Dependent variable: RelWage90ij Dependent variable: RelGDPij 
Mig2000ij 
 
0.7617a 
(0.2007) 
0.6676a 
(0.2124) 
0.3911b 
(0.1649) 
0.7987a 
(0.1871) 
0.6875a 
(0.2193) 
0.4324a 
(0.1539) 
0.5679a 
(0.1199) 
0.3883c 
(0.2371) 
0.3489b 
(0.1719) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 2259 2250 2259 
Adj. R2 0.8481 0.8484 0.8476 0.8451 0.8455 0.8447 0.9387 0.9384 0.9384 
Destination clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
F-Test (first stage) 15.2 15.9 16.5 15.2 15.9 16.5 13.5 14.4 14.8 
J-Test   - 0.702 - - 0.471 - - 0.1397 - 
Instruments used TotalMigP1ij TotalMigP1ij + 
Disti + ComLangij 
+ Contigij 
TotalMigP2ij TotalMigP1ij TotalMigP1ij + 
Disti + ComLangij 
+ Contigij 
TotalMigP2ij TotalMigP1ij TotalMigP1ij + 
Disti + ComLangij 
+ Contigij 
TotalMigP2ij 
          
First stage results (partial correlations) 
TotalMigij 0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0014a 
(0.0001) 
0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0014a 
(0.0001) 
0.0001a 
(0.0000) 
0.0001a 
(0.0000) 
0.0011a 
(0.0001) 
Distij 
  
-0.0145d 
(0.0096)     
-0.0145d 
(0.0096)     
-0.0265a 
(0.0063)   
ComLangij 
  
0.1294a 
(0.0209)     
0.1294a 
(0.0209)     
0.0943a 
(0.0126)   
Contigij 
  
-0.0517 
(0.0334)     
-0.0517 
(0.0334)     
-0.0606b 
(0.0260)   
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %.  All estimations include 
RelPrimSchool1990ij , RelTertSchool1990ij , RelInvest1990ij  and RelUrban1990ij  as additional control variables. 
 
d 
Table 5 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates in 1990 on income differences between countries (use of proxies) 
Variable 
IV  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
IV 
(9) 
 Dependent variable: RelWage80ij Dependent variable: RelWage90ij Dependent variable: RelGDPij 
Mig1990ij 
 
0.7438a 
(0.1960) 
0.6243a 
(0.2158) 
0.3774b 
(0.1592) 
0.7800a 
(0.1827) 
0.6422a 
(0.2257) 
0.4173a 
(0.1485) 
0.5905a 
(0.1247) 
0.3744d 
(0.2562) 
0.3381b 
(0.1666) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 2259 2250 2259 
Adj. R2 0.8481 0.8484 0.8476 0.8451 0.8455 0.8447 0.9387 0.9384 0.9384 
Destination clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
F-Test (first stage) 15.04 15.70 16.02 15.04 15.70 16.02 14.11 14.92 15.26 
J-Test   - 0.642  -  - 0.407  -  - 0.185 - 
Instruments used TotalMigP1ij TotalMigP1ij + 
Disti + ComLangij 
+ Contigij 
TotalMigP2ij TotalMigP1ij TotalMigP1ij + 
Disti + ComLangij 
+ Contigij 
TotalMigP2ij TotalMigP1ij TotalMigP1ij + 
Disti + ComLangij 
+ Contigij 
TotalMigP2ij 
          
First stage results (partial correlations) 
TotalMigij 0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0015a 
(0.0001) 
0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0002a 
(0.0000) 
0.0015a 
(0.0001) 
0.0001a 
(0.0000) 
0.0001a 
(0.0000) 
0.0011a 
(0.0001) 
Distij 
  
-0.0162 
(0.0110)     
-0.0162 
(0.0110)     
-0.0266a 
(0.0066)   
ComLangij 
  
0.1522a 
(0.0241)     
0.1522a 
(0.0241)     
0.1147a 
(0.0132)   
Contigij 
  
-0.0628 
(0.0385)     
-0.0628 
(0.0385)     
-0.0674b 
(0.0272)   
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %; d indicates significance 
level between 10 and 15 %. All estimations include RelPrimSchool1990ij , RelTertSchool1990ij , RelInvest1990ij  and RelUrban1990ij  as additional control variables.  
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Table S1 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates on income differences between countries 
Variable 
IV  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
 Dependent variable: RelWage80ij Dependent variable: RelWage90ij Dependent variable: RelGDPij 
Mig2000ij 
 
0.1743a 
(0.0629)   
0.1957a 
(0.0597)   
0.1922a 
(0.0358)   
Mig1990ij 
   
0.1376b 
(0.0655)   
0.1554b 
(0.0675)   
0.1524b 
(0.0613) 
OECDi -1.2225a 
(0.0561) 
-1.2231a 
(0.0561) 
-1.1299a 
(0.0539) 
-1.1305a 
(0.0539) 
-1.0241a 
(0.0316) 
-1.0245a 
(0.0316) 
RegionSsai -0.1975b 
(0.0809) 
-0.1983b 
(0.0807) 
-0.0709 
(0.0800) 
-0.0718 
(0.0798) 
0.0176 
(0.0281) 
0.0165 
(0.0283) 
RegionEapi 0.0454 
(0.0767) 
0.0439 
(0.0769) 
-0.0011 
(0.0648) 
-0.0028 
(0.0651) 
0.6282a 
(0.0373) 
0.6259a 
(0.0370) 
RelPrimSchool1990ij -0.5618a 
(0.1839) 
-0.5622a 
(0.1839) 
-0.4530a 
(0.1562) 
-0.4535a 
(0.1562) 
0.3225a 
(0.0310) 
0.3231a 
(0.0309) 
RelTertSchool1990ij 0.0085 
(0.0056) 
0.0085 
(0.0056) 
0.0079 
(0.0052) 
0.0080 
(0.0052) 
0.0037a 
(0.0010) 
0.0038a 
(0.0010) 
RelInvest1990ij 0.1276a 
(0.0208) 
0.1276a 
(0.0209) 
0.1264a 
(0.0189) 
0.1263a 
(0.0189) 
0.0811a 
(0.0108) 
0.0812a 
(0.0108) 
RelUrban1990ij 0.3758a 
(0.0521) 
0.3756a 
(0.0521) 
0.3407a 
(0.0495) 
0.3405a 
(0.0495) 
0.1856a 
(0.0141) 
0.1854a 
(0.0140) 
(incercept) 1.3636a 
(0.1749) 
1.3649a 
(0.1748) 
1.1906a 
(0.1717) 
1.1921a 
(0.1715) 
0.4707a 
(0.0735) 
0.4709a 
(0.0733) 
Origin FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
N 1010 1010 1010 1010 2275 2275 
Adj. R2 0.4905 0.4904 0.4903 0.4902 0.6725 0.6722 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %. 
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Table S2 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates on income differences between countries (log emigration stock as instrument) 
Variable 
IV  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
 Dependent variable: RelWage80ij Dependent variable: RelWage90ij Dependent variable: RelGDPij 
Mig2000ij 
 
0.4515a 
(0.1706) 
0.2879a 
(0.1056) 
0.4023b 
(0.1807) 
0.2554b 
(0.1141) 
0.2554c 
(0.1351) 
0.1141c 
(0.0681) 
RelPrimSchool1990ij -0.8013 
(1.9769) 
-0.8561 
(2.0852) 
-0.3685 
(1.8476) 
-0.4155 
(1.9356) 
-0.3943 
(0.7558) 
-0.4430 
(0.7662) 
RelTertSchool1990ij -0.0015 
(0.0074) 
0.0031 
(0.0083) 
-0.0002 
(0.0072) 
0.0039 
(0.0081) 
0.0018 
(0.0023) 
0.0033 
(0.0025) 
RelInvest1990ij 0.6068a 
(0.2234) 
0.5673b 
(0.2350) 
0.5307b 
(0.2162) 
0.4958b 
(0.2263) 
0.2391b 
(0.1096) 
0.2393b 
(0.1155) 
RelUrban1990ij 0.6805b 
(0.2699) 
0.6732b 
(0.2843) 
0.5947b 
(0.2723) 
0.5886b 
(0.2843) 
0.1831b 
(0.0830) 
0.1934b 
(0.0822) 
(incercept) 0.2245 
(2.4135) 
0.3700 
(2.5428) 
-0.0789 
(2.3583) 
0.0481 
(2.4650) 
3.8160 
(3.0059) 
3.9724 
(3.0644) 
Origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1010 1010 1010 1010 2275 2266 
Adj. R2 0.8675 0.8583 0.8624 0.8541 0.9425 0.9411 
Destination clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-Test (first stage) 14.84 18.2 14.84 18.2 18.05 19.96 
J-Test   0.312  0.242  0.315 
Instruments used  LogEmigrationStockij LogEmigrationStockij + 
Disti + ComLangij + 
Contigij 
LogEmigrationStockij LogEmigrationStockij + 
Disti + ComLangij + 
Contigij 
LogEmigrationStockij LogEmigrationStockij + 
Disti + ComLangij + 
Contigij 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %.  
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Table S3 
Effect of high skilled emigration rates on income differences between countries (Proxy constructed with Defoort, 2006 emigration rates) 
Variable 
IV  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
 Dependent variable: RelWage80ij Dependent variable: RelWage90ij Dependent variable: RelGDPij 
Mig2000ij 
 
0.5337a 
(0.1733) 
0.3056b 
(0.1536) 
0.5579a 
(0.1728) 
0.3540b 
(0.1723) 
0.3437c 
(0.1817) 
0.3619b 
(0.1835) 
RelPrimSchool1990ij -1.1455 
(2.2607) 
-1.1571 
(2.2688) 
-0.6793 
(2.0744) 
-0.6898 
(2.0816) 
-0.4362 
(0.7925) 
-0.4356 
(0.7941) 
RelTertSchool1990ij 0.0093 
(0.0096) 
0.0099 
(0.0099) 
0.0091 
(0.0093) 
0.0097 
(0.0096) 
0.0043 
(0.0027) 
0.0042 
(0.0026) 
RelInvest1990ij 0.4785c 
(0.2477) 
0.4726c 
(0.2481) 
0.4178c 
(0.2373) 
0.4125c 
(0.2382) 
0.2235c 
(0.1185) 
0.2241c 
(0.1182) 
RelUrban1990ij 0.6171b 
(0.2996) 
0.6158b 
(0.3002) 
0.5382c 
(0.2956) 
0.5371c 
(0.2964) 
0.1975b 
(0.0798) 
0.1976b 
(0.0794) 
(incercept) 0.8965 
(2.7392) 
0.9219 
(2.7514) 
0.5209 
(2.6180) 
0.5436 
(2.6292) 
3.9614 
(3.1712) 
3.9575 
(3.1781) 
Origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 932 932 932 932 2250 2259 
Adj. R2 0.8539 0.8531 0.8516 0.8508 0.9424 0.9424 
Destination clusters YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-Test (first stage) 15.22 17.33 15.22 17.3 14.804 14.43 
J-Test  0.9377   0.7770   0.4656   
Instruments used DefoortTotalMig1ij DefoortTotalMig1ij + Disti 
+ ComLangij + Contigij 
DefoortTotalMig2ij DefoortTotalMig1ij DefoortTotalMig1ij + Disti 
+ ComLangij + Contigij 
DefoortTotalMig2ij 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %. 
Instruments constructed as described in text but with Defoort (2006) data on emigration instead of the United Nations Population Division. 
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This paper argues that international migration of high-skilled workers triggers productivity effects at the 
macro level such that the wage rate of skilled workers may well rise in host countries and decline in 
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strategies which address the endogeneity problem arising from the fact that international wage 
differences affect migration decisions.  
 
Keywords
High-skilled migration; Wage effects; Total factor productivity
 
JEL Classification
F22, O30
Citation proposal
Grossmann Volker, Stadelmann David. 2010. «Wage Effects of High-skilled Migration: International 
Evidence». Working Papers SES 415, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Fribourg 
(Switzerland)
Working Papers SES
Last published :
408 Dumont P.-A., Isakov D.: Les rachats d'actions en Suisse. Objectifs, conséquences et pratiques; 
2009 
409 Friboulet J.-J.: Attractivité et économie géographique : une première approche, 2009
410 Biwolé Fouda, J.: Privatisation des Industries de Réseaux et développement durable : le cas du 
Cameroun; 2010
411 Friboulet J.-J.: La théorie néoclassique et le développement durable; 2010
412 Rohe A., Grünig R.: Strategie unter Unsicherheit; 2010  
413 Grossmann V., Stadelmann D.: Does High-Skilled Migration Affect Publicly Financed Investments?; 
2010
414 Grossmann V., Seger T., Trimborn T.: Quantifying Optimal Growth Policy; 2010
Catalogue and download links:
http://www.unifr.ch/ses/wp
http://doc.rero.ch/collection/UNIFR_WORKING_PAPERS_SES 
 
